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[L.A. No. 28426. In Bank. June 16, 1965.] 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Petitioner, v. THE SU-
PERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Re-
spondent; SHIRLEY M. HAWLEY, an Incompetent 
Person, etc., Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Counties-Torts: 1I0spitaJs-.Liability.-An action by a mental 
patient against a county to recover for injuries allegedly re-
sulting from negligent care in a county hospital was not 
barred by former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6005, which relieved 
public employees of liability only for the admission and de-
tention of mentally ill persons pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 6000-6004; such sections were not concerned with the course 
of treatment once treatment began and therefore did not pro-
vide immunity for negligent conduct in the course of treatment. 
[2] HospitaJs-.Liability: Public Employees - Liability. - Former 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6005, relieving public employees from 
liability for admission and detention of a mental patient to a 
county hospital, merely codified in part the usual rule that 
public employees were liable for torts committed while acting 
in a ministerial capacity but not while acting in a discretionary 
capacity. 
IS] Counties-Torts: 1I0spitals-Liability.-A mental patient in-
jured in a county hospital had a cause of action against the 
county under a Supreme Court decision refusing to shield a 
public body from liability for torts of its agents acting in a 
ministerial capacity (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 
Cal.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457]), but the effect of 
that decision was suspended by the 1961 moratorium legis-
lation. (Civ. Code, § 22.3.) 
[4J ld.-Torts: 1I0spitaJs-.Liability.-Gov. Code, §§ 810-996.6, con-
cerning governmental immunity, do not eliminate a county's 
responsibility for the negligence of its employees in treating 
a mental patient, but provide that the county is not directly 
liable (Gov. Code, § 854.8) and provide for the public entity's 
[lJ Immunity from liability for damages in tort of state or 
governmental unit or agency in operating hospital, note, 25 A.L.R.2d 
203. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Counties, § 65; Hospitals and Asylums, 
§§ 13-17; Am.Jnr., Counties (1st ed § 48); Hospitals and Asylums 
(1st ed §§ 12-18). 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11J Counties, § 109; 
Hospitals, § 8; [2, 5] Hospitals, § 8; Public Employees, § 9; [8 J 
Constitutional Law, § 124; [9J Statutes, § 23; [12J Constitutional 
Law, § 150. 
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liability for any judgment based on a claim against a public 
employee licensed in the healing arts for malpractice and 
arising from an action or omission in the scope of his em-
ployment. 
[6] Hospitals- Liability: Public Employees - Liability. - Gov. 
Code, § 854.8, and other sections concerning governmental 
immunity in regard to mental institutions reflect a policy to 
provide immunity for diagnosing, treating, confining, and re-
leasing the mentally ill, but make public entities and their 
employees liable for injuries caused by negligent or wrongful 
acts or omissions in administering or failing to administer 
prescribed treatment or confinement. 
[6] Counties-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-The placing of a men-
tal patient in soft restraints or the using of bedrails are steps 
in administering a course of treatment, not in deciding whether 
to treat her, and hospital employees of a public entity can be 
held liable for negligence in such administrations and the pub-
lic entity must pay any judgment against them according to the 
prescribed procedure. (Gov. Code, §§ 825-825.6.) 
[7] Id.-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-Under Gov. Code, § 854.8, 
subd. (d), a public entity cannot be directly sued to enforce its 
liability for negligence; that subdivision refers to Gov. Code, 
§§ 825-825.6, providing a procedure for public entities to pay 
judgments against their employees licensed in the healing arts. 
Thus, the remedies available against a public entity under 
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr •. 
89, 359 P.2d 457] are limited by such legislation. ,1 
[8] Constitutional Law-Retrospective Laws-Vested Rights.-
With respect to retroactive application of a statute, there is 
no constitutional basis for distinguishing statutory from com-
mon-law rights merely because of their origin; describing a 
right as "vested" is merely conclusory. 
[9] Statutes-Power to Make Statute Retroactive.-Though the 
Legislature normally legislates prospectively, it can provide 
for retroactive application of a statute when it has a reason-
able basis for doing so. 
[10] Counties-Torts: Hospitals-Liability.-Making Gov. Code, 
§§ 810-996.6, governing the tort liability of government 
agencies, apply retroactively to limit the right of recovery 
against a public entity as determined by Muskopf v. Corning 
Hospital Dist., 55_Ca1.2d 211 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457], is 
constitutionally permissible as a reasonable solution to the 
problems created by that decision where no unfairness results 
from the retroactive application of the statutes. 
[8J See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 223; Am.Jur.2d, Con-
stitutional Law, § 419 et seq. 
'J '. 
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[l1a, 11b] ld.-Tortli: lIospitals-Liability,-Gov. ·Code, § 854.8, 
providing that a public agency is liable for an injury- to a 
person committed to a mental institution only after the liability 
of specific public employees has been established, did not deny 
equal protection of the laws to a' mental patient injured in a 
county hospital on the ground that the county would have been 
directly liable had the injury occurred in a medical ward 
rather than a mental ward, where, in treating mental patients 
as a class by themselves, the Legislature could appropriately 
consider the special problems of diagnosis and treatment of 
mental patients, the problems of excessive patient load in 
public mental institutions, and the problems that may arise 
as to the competency of the mentally ill as witnesses. 
[12] Oonstitutional Law-Olassifieation-Legislative Discretion.-
The Legislature has broad discretion to make classifications, 
and its decision will be upheld, unless the classification has no 
reasonable relation to any proper legislative purpose. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County from taking further proceedings 
in an action for damages for injury suffered as patient in 
psychiatric unjt of county hospital. Writ granted. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Lloyd S. Davis, 
Chief Trial Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Willard A. Shank, 
Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. 0 'Brien, Deputy 
Attorney General, Harry S. Fenton, Robert F. Carlson and 
Kenneth G. Nellis as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Wise, Kilpatrick & Clayton and GeorgeE. Wise for neal 
Party in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner, the County of Los Angeles, 
seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the trial court from 
proceeding further with an action brought by the real party 
in interest, Shirley M. Hawley.l Mrs. Hawley filed her com-
plaint on September 1, 1961, alleging that she suffered per-
sonal injuries caused by the negligence of employees of the 
Los Angeles County Hospital. Only her action against the 
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county is involved in this proceeding. The action was nor; 
brought to trial until November 25, 1964, because of the 1961:: 
moratorium established by Civil Code section 22.3 on causes:; 
of action against public agencies. The county contends tha$.: 
the action must be dismissed because it is barred by the 1968 'S 
statutes governing the tort liability of public agencies. (Gov.-" 
Code, §§ 810-895.8.) " 
The facts are stipulated. On September 4, 1960, Mrs. Haw# : 
ley was admitted to the Los Angeles County Hospital for 
barbiturate intoxication and alcoholism. On September 5, 
one of the, attending physicians ordered that she be placed ; 
in "soft restraints," that is, a tying of the hands to prevent' 
injury to the patient. On September 6, a staff psychiatrist ~ 
examined her, found that she had a "probably infantile ',' 
personality," and recommended her transfer to the psy .. ~: 
chiatric unit for observation. A health officer then applied, 
for her emergency admission to the psychiatric unit on the ,.~ 
ground that she was mentally ill and therefore likely to injure' 
herself or others if not immediately hospitalized. (Welf. &, 
Inst. Code, § 5050.3.) At about 4 p.m. on September 6, she'; 
was moved from the medical unit to the psychiatric unit. At 
about 5 p.m., while in the admitting room of the psychiatric ,~, 
unit, she fell from her bed and allegedly suffered a severe 
brain injury. A registered nurse was present and in charge' 
of the admitting room. Mrs. Hawley was not being restrained' 
with soft restraints or otherwise, and no bedrails were being,: 
used. 
At the time of the injury, in September 1960, Mrs. Hawley: 
could not have recovered against tbe county because of the ;' 
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity. (TaZZey vJ' 
Northern San Diego Hosp. Dist., 41 Ca1.2d 33 (257 P.2d 
22].) [1] The county contends that she would also have 
been barred by section 6005 of the Welfare and Institu-
tions Code. This contention is without merit. Section 6005 
, provided: "Any superintendent or person in charge of the . 
county psychopathic hospital, and any public officer, public ; 
employee, or public physician who either admits, causes to 
be admitted, delivers or assists in delivering, detains, cares 
for, or treats, or assists in detaining, caring for or treating, 
any person pursuant to this chapter shall not be rendered 
liable thereby either civilly or criminally.' '2 Section 6005 
relieves public employees of liability only for activity done i 
2In 1963, the seetion was IImended to provide only for criminal immunity. 
Civil immunity is now governed by Government Code sections 854·856.4. . 
.~-... ~- ......... . 
) 
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"pursuant to this chapter," and the chapter provides only 
for procedures of admission and detention of mentally ill 
persons. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6000-6004.) Nothing in the 
chapter is concerned with the course of treatment once treat-
ment has begun, and the section therefore does not provide 
immunity for negligent conduct in the course of treatment. 
[2] It merely codifies in part the usual rule of liability of 
public employees: they are liable for torts committed while 
acting in a ministerial capacity but not while acting in a 
discretionary capacity. (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary 
School Dist., 55 Ca1.2d 224, 229 [11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 
465].) 
[3] In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211 
[11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457], this court held that the rule 
of governmental immunity _ that would "-ave - barred Mrs. 
HawlElY at the time of the injury could nu longer J., invoked 
to shield a public body from liability for the torts 01 its agents 
who acted in a ministerial capacity. Mrs. Hawley thus had a 
cause of action against the county under Muskopf, but the 
effect of that decision was suspended hy the enactment of 
the moratorium legislation of 1961. (Civ. Code, § 22.3; 
Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 493-
495 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325].) [4] In 1963 the 
Legislature added division 3.6 to the Government Code 
(§§ 810-996.6) to deal comprehensively with the problem of 
governmental immuuity. This legislation does not eliminate 
the county's responsibility for the negligence of its employees 
-in this case but provides that it is not directly liable to Mrs. 
'Hawley. . 
Government Code section 854.8 provides: "(a) [E]xC('pt 
as provided in [subdivision] ... (d) of this section, a public 
entity is not liable for: ... (2) An injury to any person com-
mitted or admitted to a mental institution .... (d) Nothing 
in this section exonerates a public employee from liability 
for injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful 
act or omission.... [T]he public entity shall pay, as pro-
vided in Article 4 (commencing with Section 825) of Chapter 1 
of this part, any judgment based on a claim against a public 
employee licensed in one of the healing arts under Division 2 
(commencing with Section 500) of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code for malpractice arising from an act or omission 
ill the scope of his employment .... " [6] This section and 
other s('ctions concerning mental institutions reflect the policy 
recommended by the Law Revision Commission. That policy 
) 
) 
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provides immunity for diagnosing, treating, confining, and;: 
releasing the mentally ill, but makes clear "that public en-! 
tities and employees are liable for injuries caused by negligent " 
or wrongful acts or omissions in administering or failing to1 
administer prescribed treatment or confinement." (4 Cal.~· 
Law Revision Com. Rep. 830; see Gov. Code, §§ 855.8, 856.) 
[6] In this case, the placing of Mrs. Hawley in soft re-
straints or the using of bedrails are steps in administering 
a course of treatment, not in the decision whether to treat 
her. The employees can therefore be held liable for negligence 
in such administration, and the "public entity shall pay" 
any judgment against them according to the prescribed pro-
cedure. (Gov. Code, § § 825-825.6.) 
[7] Under section 854.8, subdivision (d), the public en-
tity cannot be directly sued to enforce its liability for negli-
gence. That subdivision refers to article 4 of chapter 1, 
part 2 (Gov. Code, §§ 825-825.6), which provides the pro-
cedure whereby public entities pay judgments against their 
employees. First, however, there must be a judgment against· 
an employee or employees licensed under division 2 of the 
Business and Professions Code, such as doctors, nurses, and 
psychiatric technicians. The 1963 legislation, therefore, 
limits the remedies that were available under Muskopf by 
making the county's liability solely derivative. 
Mrs. Hawley contends, however, that the 1963 legislation 
cannot be applied retroactively to restrict the county's lia- . 
bility under Muskopf. She contends that although the Legis-
lature can retroactively abrogate rights provided by statute, 
it cannot retroactively change the common law to abrogate a . 
"vested right." (See OaUet v .. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290 
P. 438J.) [8] We find no constitutional basis for distin-
guishing statutory from common-law rights merely because· 
of their origin (see 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 526), and 
describing a right as "vested" is merely conclusory. (Flour-
noy v. State of Oalifornia, 230 Cal.App.2d 520, 531 [41 
Cal.Rptr. 190J.) We must consider instead the reasons ad-
vanced to justify retroactive application of a statute to deter-
mine if it is constitutionally permissible. [9] Although the 
Legislature normally legislates prospectively, it can provide 
for retroactive application of a statute if it has a reasonable 
basis for d9ing so. [10] Here, the Legislature responded 
to this court's abrogation of the common-law doctrine of 
governmental immunity by enacting comprehensiw l('gisla-
tion to govern the liability of public employees and publj,' 
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entities. It expressly made the legislation retroactive "to the 
full extent that it constitutionally can be so applied" (Stats. 
1963, ch. 1681, § 45, subd. (a); cf. Corning Hospital Dist. 
V. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 488, 494 [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 
P.2d 325] ; Callet V. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [290 P. 438]) to place 
aU potential plaintiffs whose claims are not barred by the 
statute of limitations on an equal footing. Retroactivity also 
serves to clarify the fiscal responsibilities of public agencies 
following the abrogation of governmental immunity, thus 
preventing the uncertainties that would result if the scope 
of their liability were left to case-by-case resolution in the 
courts. 
It is not unfair to apply the statute retroactively. Potential 
plaintiffs who were injured before the Muskopf case was de-
cided clearly could not have relied on that case. (Cf. Wells 
Fargo & CO. V. City & County of San Francisco, 25 Ca1.2d 
37 [152 P.2d 625] ; Norton v. City of Pomona, 5 Ca1.2d 54 
[53 P.2d 952].) Moreover, it is purely speculative to assume 
that other potential plaintiffs would have protected them-
selves in some way during the period between the Muskopf 
decision and the moratorium legislation had they foreseen 
statutory modification of that case. Indeed, to hold that the 
Muskopf case created vested rights that could not be abro-
gated by the 1963 legislation would create a special class of 
favored plaintiffs: those who had causes of action that were 
not barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the 
M 1lskopf decision but that would be barred by the 1963 legis-
lation.a Such a holding would give unlimited retroactive 
effect to the Muskopf case and no retroactive effect to the 
1963 legislation. The Legislature, as well as the eourt, how-
ever, is competent to define the retroactive scope of an over-
ruling decision. (Forster ShipbZdg. Co. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 54 Ca1.2d 450, 459 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P.2d 736].) 
If it adopts a reasonable solution to the problems created by 
such a decision, as it has done here, its determination will 
be upheld. 
SThe dietum in Jone8 V. City of Los Angeles, 215 Ca1.App.2d 155, 156-
157 [30 Cal.Rptr. 124], referring to the cause of action as vested, could 
only be referring to its continuation through the moratorium period. No 
legislation had been passed at the time of that case, and nothing in 
M'USkopf or in Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488 
[20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325], supports a holding that the Legislature 
cannot constitutionally modify the rules of governmental i=unity reo 
troactively. (See, e.g., Flournoy v. State of California, 8upra, 230 Cal. 
App.2d 520; City of Burbank V. Superior Court, 231 Cal.App.2d 675, 
682-683 [42 Cal.Rptr. 23].) 
) 
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[Ua] Mrs. Hawley contends, however, that section 854:8 
denies her the equal protection of the laws on the ground' 
that the county would be directly liable had she been injured;i 
in a medical ward rather than a mental ward. (See U.S .. )I 
Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 11, 21; Cal. Const:;';, 
art. IV, § 25.) [12] The Legislature has broad discretion 'I 
in making classifications, and its decision will be upheld" 
unless the classification has no reasonable relationship to any¥ 
proper legislative purpose. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of .\1 
Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563]; .~ 
Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Ca1.2d 228l '~:it 
233 [18 Cal.Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101].) rUb] In limiting ." 
governmental liability for the operation of mental institu-·j 
tions, the Legislature could appropriately consider the special JI 
problems of diagnosis and treatment in the field of mental 'I~ 
illness, the problems of excessive patient load in public mental ~ .•'.' 
institutions that must take all patients committed to them,-~ 
and the problems that may arise with respect to the compe- -., . 
tency of the mentally ill as witnesses. (See 4 Cal. Law Re- ]~ 
vision Com. Rep. 830; People v. McCaughan, 49 Ca1.2d409, '~ 
419-422 [317 P.2d 974].) We cannot say that such factors .~ 
are insufficient to justify the Legislature in treating mentaljli 
patients as a class by themselves and in providing that only:: ' 
when they can establish the liability of specific public em:, 
ployees should the public agency be liable to them."'" 
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk,~.,~· 
and Burke, J., concurred. 
.-; 
